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1. Overview 
Conflict drivers/breaks often affect multiple countries simultaneously. Moreover, conflict drivers 
such as violent extremism; migration; and goods trafficking are often interlinked (Browne, 2013, 
p. 1). Migration and trafficking often follow the same geographical routes through multiple 
countries, and can also involve weapons smuggling for extremist groups. Moreover, extremists’ 
movements across borders can frequently interact with trafficking for profit (Browne, 2013, p. 1).  
This report provides an overview of the evidence on cross-border conflict drivers/breaks along 
the Sudan - Egypt - Jordan route. As the evidence base linking these countries together is very 
limited, this report also includes literature that addresses conflict/drivers breaks that occur in just 
some of the countries covered in this report. The majority of the literature uncovered while 
undertaking research for this report looks at potential conflict drivers in the countries considered, 
rather than at conflict breaks.  
The following are some of the key conflict drivers/ breaks in Sudan, Egypt, and Jordan identified 
in the literature: 
▪ Migration:  There is a significant evidence base on migration in Sudan, Egypt, and 
Jordan. The nature of the literature is diverse, ranging from opinion pieces to more 
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rigorous empirical research by organisations like the Regional Mixed Migration 
Secretariat and the North African Mixed Migration Task Force (NAMMTF). The latter are 
generally based on fieldwork and combine quantitative and qualitative data.  
▪ Religious extremism: There is a considerable body of literature on religious extremism 
in the countries considered in this report. However, much of the writing on this topic 
consists of opinion pieces and conjecture rather than rigorous research. This is 
especially the case when looking at the literature on extremist groups like the Islamic 
State (IS).  
▪ Economic marginalisation and state repression: The literature on economic 
marginalisation and state repression links these issues both to protest movements and to 
violent extremism. It focuses largely on the Egyptian and Sudanese contexts. 
▪ Natural resources: There is some evidence to suggest that water scarcity is a potential 
driver of conflict in all the countries covered in this report. The literature focuses largely 
on how Egypt and Sudan respectively have reacted to Ethiopia’s building of a dam on 
the Blue Nile. One article suggests that increased cooperation over the Nile waters could 
also constitute a form of conflict prevention. 
▪ Drugs: One literature review suggests that cannabis may be being smuggled from 
Sudan and Chad to Egypt. However the research undertaken for this report has not 
uncovered any further evidence on drug smuggling along the Sudan – Egypt – Jordan 
route. 
▪ Trade: There is very little literature on trade between the countries considered in this 
report.  
▪ Arms: The research undertaken for this report has not uncovered any literature or 
evidence that there are arms flows along the Sudan – Egypt - Jordan route. 
The literature considered in this review was largely gender-blind. Where gender is addressed it is 
generally in the context of women’s experiences of migration. 
2. Conflict drivers/breaks 
There are a number of conflict drivers/ breaks that affect all of the countries considered in this 
report. However, the extent to which they affect each location varies and the research 
undertaken for this report has not uncovered any evidence linking these factors along the Sudan 
– Egypt – Jordan route. Evidence on conflict drivers/ breaks that affect at least two of the 
countries considered have therefore also been included in this report. 
Migration 
There is a significant body of literature on the impact of migration in Sudan, Egypt, and Jordan. 
This literature addresses both forced and voluntary migration, as well as human trafficking and 
people smuggling. 
A rapid fragility and migration assessment of Sudan produced by GSDRC summarises the 
journeys faced by migrants originating from Sudan, passing through Sudan, and arriving in 
Sudan (Strachan, 2016).  This includes the journey on to Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula. It also 
provides an overview of the drivers of fragility and migration in Sudan. Similarly, a workshop 
report on human trafficking in conflict briefly addresses the migrant journey from Sudan to Egypt, 
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noting that migrants along this route may have been targeted for organ harvesting (Cockayne & 
Summers, 2016, p. 11). 
A NAMTF report (2015) provides a very comprehensive description of the journeys undertaken 
by migrants from the Horn of Africa traveling to the Middle East and North Africa, and onwards to 
Europe. In addition to documenting routes taken by migrants it also looks at the existing legal 
frameworks for mixed migration in each of the countries that migrants pass through, and it looks 
at the problem of human trafficking. The report notes that while the problem appears to have 
decreased in the Sinai Peninsula, it has increased on the Sudan – Eritrea border (NAMTF, 2015, 
p. 37). The report is based on fieldwork in a number of countries, including Sudan and Egypt. 
However, it does not cover Jordan. The NAMTF or Mixed Migration Hub (MHub) also publishes 
monthly mixed migration trends bulletins, which provide up-to-date statistics on migrants passing 
through North Africa, including Sudanese migrants in Egypt.1 The Regional Mixed Migration 
Secretariat (RMMS) has also produced a number of reports describing key migration routes and 
highlighting the effective closure of the route from the Horn of Africa to Israel via Egypt and the 
Sinai Peninsula, due to a crackdown on illegal immigration in Israel. Like the NAMTF report, 
these reports note that this has also resulted in a significant reduction in human trafficking 
incidents in the Sinai Peninsula, although they still occur (see for example RMMS, 2016 and 
RMMS, 2015). This suggests that older reports (pre- 2013) on this issue are likely to be outdated. 
However, a policy brief by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime suggests 
that trafficking in the Sinai Peninsula continues on the route to and from Jordan (to Libya) and 
that there is potential for this to increase (The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 2015). The policy brief also highlights the involvement of IS in human trafficking in the 
Sinai Peninsula and the potential for them to actively seek to increase the refugee population in 
the area for their own financial gain (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2015, p. 8).  
A policy-oriented Carnegie Endowment report discusses the impact of the presence of a large 
number of refugees In Jordan, noting that the significant influx of Syrian refugees ‘has pushed 
Jordanian coping mechanisms and financial and infrastructural capacities to the limit,’ especially 
given the country’s experiences with the earlier Iraqi refugee crisis caused by the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion and the civil war that followed (Yahya, 2015, p. 11). Similarly, a research report by the 
Morocco based OCP Policy Center also provides a detailed assessment of the impact of large 
numbers of refugees on Jordanian infrastructure, economy, and social dynamics (Dadush & 
Niebuhr, 2016). It notes that while Jordan has received a large number of refugees, Sudan, a 
less developed country, has received many more (Dadush & Niebuhr, 2016). Another policy-
oriented report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also looks at the 
challenges Jordan is facing to the large numbers of Syrian refugees it is hosting (Francis, 2015). 
However, the report also discusses the positive economic impact the sizeable refugee population 
is having. It notes that increased public investment in response to the influx of refugees, as well 
as the consumption of Syrian refugees has contributed to economic growth in Jordan (Francis, 
2015, p. 14). 




There is a significant body of literature on the Islamic State (IS) and its activities in Egypt, Sinai 
and Jordan. However, much of this literature is not evidence-based. Rather it consists of opinion 
pieces and conjecture. It is largely produced by European and North American think tanks.  
There is considerable overlap between the literature on religious extremism and the literature on 
economic marginalisation and state repression discussed below. A policy brief by the Global 
Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime highlights the crime – terror nexus in the Trans-
Sahara (including Egypt and the Sinai peninsula) (2015, p. 8). The brief also links migrant flows 
to violent extremism, noting that the movement of people through the Trans-Sahara region is a 
potential recruiting ground or cover for the movement of foreign fighters2 (Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2015, p.8).  
Foreign fighters 
A comprehensive desk-based study on foreign fighters by the security analysis firm, The Soufan 
Group, finds that all of the countries in this report are sources of foreign fighters. However, these 
foreign fighters are generally heading to conflict zones like Syria and Iraq and as such they 
constitute a driver of conflict in their destination countries rather than in the countries considered 
in this report (The Soufan Group, 2015).  The report includes the caveat that it is extremely 
difficult to find accurate numbers on foreign fighters (The Soufan Group, 2015, p. 5). The 
research undertaken for this report did not uncover any evidence of foreign fighters operating in 
Sudan, Egypt, or Jordan.  
Economic marginalisation and state repression 
Cachalia (2015) provides a brief overview of the rise of IS and other violent extremist groups in 
the Sinai Peninsula arguing that this, and the consequent rise in terrorist attacks, is largely due to 
state repression and economic marginalisation. 
An Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) conflict trends report, based on 
quantitative conflict location and events data, provides limited information on politically and 
economically motivated violent protests in Sudan and Egypt, although it does not highlight any 
links between protest movements in the two countries (ACLED, 2016). The rapid fragility and 
migration assessment for Sudan mentioned in the section on migration also looks at political and 
economic exclusion in Sudan as a driver of fragility. It summarises the evidence on exclusion on 
the basis of ethnicity and language, as well as on disparities between states within Sudan in 
terms of economic, social and cultural rights (Strachan, 2016). It also summarises the literature 
on discrimination faced by internally displaced persons in Sudan (Strachan, 2016). 
Natural resources 
The research undertaken for this report did not uncover any literature directly addressing natural 
resources as a cross-border conflict driver/break between all the countries considered in this 
                                                 
2 Individuals who travel overseas to fight for extremist groups. 
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report.  However, there are a few articles addressing water and gold mining as potential conflict 
drivers/breaks between or within some of the countries covered in this report. 
Water 
An Institute for Security Studies (ISS) opinion piece briefly discusses the potential both for 
conflict and for increased cooperation and conflict prevention between some of the Nile riparian 
states, including Egypt and Sudan, over the Nile waters. However, it does not provide an in-
depth analysis and it is not evidence-based (Tadesse, 2012). An opinion piece in the Economist 
addresses the same issue, noting that Sudan initially sided with Egypt over Ethiopia’s 
controversial construction of a dam on the Blue Nile, but later changed sides when it realised that 
it stood to benefit from the dam’s construction (Economist, 2016). The online Environment, 
Conflict and Cooperation Platform also highlights the potential for tensions arising from Egypt’s 
interest in the newly independent South Sudan’s wetland area called the Sudd, which it views as 
a potential source of additional water.3 Water issues are also discussed in Woodward’s analysis 
of the relationship between Egypt and Sudan in the context of South Sudan’s independence 
(2010). It is important to note that this paper pre-dates South Sudan’s independence from Sudan. 
There is also a small body of literature on water as a potential driver of conflict in Jordan. 
However, the dispute is not with Egypt or Sudan, but rather with Israel (Haddadin, 2014). 
Gold 
There is some literature on gold mining as a driver of conflict in North Darfur, for example 
Tubiana’s 2015 article in Foreign Affairs magazine. This largely consists of articles in current 
affairs magazines and blog posts, rather than of rigorous evidence-based academic research. 
There have also been tensions between Egypt and Sudan over gold mines in the disputed 
Hala’ib triangle between the two countries. However, this issue appears to be limited to the 
border between the two countries – there is no evidence to suggest that gold mining is a driver or 
potential driver of conflict in the rest of Egypt or in Jordan. The evidence base on this potential 
driver of conflict is largely limited to news articles and opinion pieces. 
Drugs 
A GSDRC report on border insecurity in North Africa includes a brief mention of cannabis 
smuggling, stating that one of the routes used is through Chad and Sudan to Egypt (Browne, 
2013, p. 5). However, while drug smuggling is potentially a problem in all of the countries and 
territories looked at in this report, this research has not uncovered any evidence on the issue in 
the context of the Sudan-Egypt -Jordan route. 
Trade 
Woodward’s analysis of the relationship between Egypt and Sudan in the context of South 
Sudan’s independence touches on trade between the two countries, noting that this is not 
significant and that both countries have many more important trading partners (2010, p. 15). It is 
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important to note that this paper pre-dates South Sudan’s independence from Sudan. In addition, 
a quantitative working paper published by the Egypt-based Economic Research Forum, looks at 
the potential for increased trade between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Ebaidalla, 2015). 
Arms  
While arms flows are potentially a problem in some of the countries and territories looked at in 
this report, this research has not uncovered any evidence on the issue in the context of the 
Sudan-Egypt Jordan route. 
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